Preparing Mozambique for the Green Industrial Trade Transition
Mozal's closure exposed what green trade demands: clean, affordable power and credible emissions data. A five-pillar plan for Mozambique's CBAM readiness.
Executive Summary
The European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism has applied in its definitive regime since 1 January 2026, covering aluminium, iron and steel, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen. For Mozambique, the question is sharper than compliance. The Mozal aluminium smelter was placed in care and maintenance in March 2026 after failing to secure a sufficient and affordable long-term electricity supply, and no buyer or restart date has been confirmed. This brief argues that the closure carries a central lesson: in a carbon-constrained trade environment, industrial competitiveness depends on electricity that is reliable, affordable and demonstrably low carbon, backed by credible measurement, reporting and verification. It proposes a Mozambique Green Trade Readiness Framework with five pillars: carbon intelligence for trade; clean-power competitiveness; green industrial parks and corridors; finance and technology access; and a just transition. It closes with 20 recommendations sequenced from 2026 to 2035 and beyond.
Key Findings
CBAM's definitive regime has applied since 1 January 2026; aluminium, Mozambique's most exposed export, is covered. Mozal accounted for roughly 70 to 90 percent of Mozambique's industrial energy consumption before it closed in March 2026. The smelter closed for lack of affordable, reliable long-term power, not because of CBAM itself. Exporters without credible emissions data risk being assessed on default values higher than their actual emissions. Mozambique's Energy Transition Strategy calls for at least 1 GW of new solar and 200 to 500 MW of new wind by 2030, with investment needs above USD 80 billion to 2050. Measurement, reporting and verification should be treated as trade infrastructure, not an environmental add-on. Any Mozal restart or successor investment should be judged against clean, competitive power, credible emissions data and benefits for Mozambican workers and suppliers.
On 1 January 2026, the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism moved into its definitive regime. Importers of aluminium, iron and steel, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen now have to declare the emissions embedded in those goods and buy certificates to cover them. For most of Africa, the mechanism is a future cost to plan around. For Mozambique, it arrived alongside a more immediate shock.
In March 2026, the Mozal aluminium smelter near Maputo, long the country's largest industrial operation, was placed in care and maintenance after its owners failed to secure a sufficient and affordable electricity supply beyond the expiry of its power contract. Before it closed, Mozal accounted for roughly 70 to 90 percent of Mozambique's industrial energy consumption.
Edvânia Ana Paulino D'Uamba's policy brief starts from that coincidence and draws a clear conclusion. Mozal did not close because of the carbon border mechanism. It closed because electricity became unaffordable. In a carbon-constrained trade environment, the two problems become one: industrial survival depends on power that is reliable, competitively priced and demonstrably low carbon.
A smelter that was supposed to benefit
The irony is sharp. Before the closure, analysis for the International Growth Centre found that Mozal could strengthen its competitive position under the carbon border mechanism, because it emits less carbon per tonne of aluminium than most smelters worldwide. A low-carbon producer should gain when carbon carries a price.
D'Uamba treats that finding with care. It illustrates the value of low-carbon production, but it is not a forecast for a plant that is no longer operating. The brief also clarifies a technical point that is often missed: under the current rules, the indirect emissions from electricity are not yet included in the certificate obligation for aluminium. Direct process emissions are what count for now. Clean power still shapes operating costs, buyer requirements and access to green finance, and the rules may widen.
Data as trade infrastructure
The brief's most practical argument concerns measurement. Exporters without credible emissions data risk being assessed on default values that are higher than their actual emissions, a danger that the African Climate Foundation and London School of Economics flagged for African producers. A country with genuinely low-carbon production can still lose its advantage if it cannot prove it.
D'Uamba argues that measurement, reporting and verification should be built as trade infrastructure: sector-specific methodologies aligned with the EU rules, facility-level accounting, trained and accredited verifiers, and coordination across the energy, industry, environment, trade, finance and customs institutions. She also warns against claims of clean electricity that do not reflect real reductions in emissions across the system.
A strategy that already exists
Mozambique does not have to start from scratch. Its Energy Transition Strategy 2023–2050 already proposes repatriating power from Cahora Bassa for domestic use, expanding the grid, at least 1 GW of new solar and 200 to 500 MW of new wind by 2030, corporate power-purchase agreements, industrial self-generation and green industrial parks. Its estimated investment needs exceed USD 80 billion to 2050.
The brief's contribution is to read that energy strategy as a trade and industrial competitiveness strategy. Its proposed Green Trade Readiness Framework has five pillars: carbon intelligence for trade; clean-power competitiveness; green industrial parks and corridors that work as competitiveness platforms rather than serviced land; finance and technology access; and a just transition that protects workers and builds local suppliers. Twenty recommendations follow, sequenced from immediate steps in 2026 to 2028, such as a national coordination mechanism and an MRV roadmap, to longer-term ambitions such as a regional platform for low-carbon processing.
The test for any restart
The smelter's future remains open. Recent reporting describes talks led by South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation with former shareholders about a possible revival, but no transaction or restart date has been confirmed. D'Uamba does not predict the outcome. She proposes a benchmark instead: any restart, new operator or successor investment should be judged against clean and competitive electricity, credible emissions data, financial viability, local employment, supplier development, fiscal value and environmental safeguards.
That benchmark reaches well beyond one plant. By treating the carbon border mechanism as a catalyst rather than a compliance burden, the brief argues, Mozambique can move from reacting to European rules to building a durable basis for clean and inclusive industrial development.
The full Policy Brief is available to download below.
Suggested Citation
D'Uamba, E. A. P. (2026). Preparing Mozambique for the Green Industrial Trade Transition: Operationalising the Energy Transition Strategy for CBAM Readiness. ETA Policy Brief: Energy Transition Africa.