The Green Transition Illusion: Why Critical Minerals Alone Will Not Industrialise Africa
New policy analysis by Elvis Korku Avenyo, The Green Transition Illusion: Africa owns the minerals, but who controls the production system?

Executive Summary
African governments, development partners and investors increasingly see critical minerals as Africa's next great industrialisation opportunity. The opportunity is real, but the conclusion drawn from it may not hold. Between a mineral deposit and a finished green technology lie finance, equipment, engineering, processing, logistics, standards, intellectual property and manufacturing, and Africa risks confusing owning the resource with controlling the production system. Drawing on IEA data, a 2025 World Bank-commissioned study and South Africa's mineral policy, this analysis argues that local procurement, localisation and beneficiation targets are often met without building technological capability. It proposes that major mineral and beneficiation investments carry capability-development plans with measurable milestones, so that the green transition becomes a capabilities transition rather than another commodity cycle.
Key Findings
Africa accounts for 73 percent of global cobalt production, 69 percent of tantalum, 65 percent of manganese and 57 percent of platinum-group metals.
China accounted for 72 percent of the refined supply of key energy minerals in 2025.
China is projected to account for 91 percent of battery-grade graphite production in 2035.
For 29 of 40 green-transition minerals, less than 8.5 percent of Africa's exports went to other African countries in 2022.
Refining cobalt locally in the DRC raised its unit value from US$5.8 to US$16.2 per kilogram, but processing alone does not guarantee structural transformation.
Local procurement and localisation targets can be met without suppliers acquiring the capability to design, manufacture or improve technology.
Major mineral investments should carry capability-development plans with measurable milestones, monitored over the life of the project.
Across Africa, governments, development partners and investors are telling a compelling story. The continent holds substantial reserves of the minerals the green economy runs on, including cobalt, platinum-group metals, manganese, graphite and copper. Extract them, process more of them locally, attract investment, and the energy transition will bring manufacturing, jobs and technological upgrading.
Elvis Korku Avenyo, a development economist at the University of Johannesburg, accepts the opportunity and questions the conclusion. Between a mineral deposit and a finished battery or wind turbine lie exploration finance, mining equipment, engineering, processing technology, logistics, standards, intellectual property, manufacturing and long-term finance. A deposit is only the beginning of a much longer chain. The danger, he argues, is that Africa confuses owning the resource with controlling the production system.
Abundance is not power
The numbers make the point. Research Avenyo co-authored for the World Bank in 2025 finds that Africa accounts for 73 percent of global cobalt production, 69 percent of tantalum, 65 percent of manganese and 57 percent of platinum-group metals, concentrated in a few countries. Refining is concentrated elsewhere. According to the IEA's Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026, China accounted for 72 percent of the refined supply of key energy minerals in 2025, and is projected to produce 91 percent of battery-grade graphite in 2035.
Trade reinforces the pattern. In 2022, China was the leading destination for 16 of the 40 green-transition minerals the World Bank study analysed, while for 29 of those 40 minerals, less than 8.5 percent of Africa's exports went to other African countries. Africa's mineral economy is organised around markets outside the continent, not an integrated African production system.
Why beneficiation is not enough
Governments increasingly recognise this, and beneficiation and local processing now feature in national and continental strategies. Avenyo welcomes the shift but warns it can become another illusion if treated as the end point. Processing can raise value: refining cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo lifted its unit value from US$5.8 to US$16.2 a kilogram. But much of Africa's processed output stays at intermediate stages, leaving the more sophisticated activities, and the learning they bring, elsewhere.
The deeper question is institutional. Does an investment create incentives and obligations for domestic engineering, supplier development, research and skills? Or are firms rewarded mainly for meeting production, investment and procurement targets?
When localisation becomes compliance
South Africa shows the mechanism. Its 2025 Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy already recognises value addition, research, skills and infrastructure among its pillars. Its 2018 Mining Charter operationalises transformation partly through procurement and supplier-development requirements.
Those instruments create real local linkages, Avenyo argues, but spending is not the same as capability. A mining company can meet a local procurement target by buying from a domestic supplier that never learns to design, manufacture or improve the underlying technology. A processing plant can meet localisation rules while importing the critical equipment and know-how it depends on.
The result is not deliberate obstruction. It is subtler. What is easy to measure gets enforced: investment committed, output achieved, procurement spent, jobs created. What is harder to measure, such as technology absorbed, engineering capability developed and suppliers upgraded, becomes an expected spillover rather than a requirement.
Judging investments by what they leave behind
The paper does not ask Africa to stop mining, reject foreign investment or manufacture every component itself. It asks governments to change the question. For major mineral and beneficiation investments, they should ask what capabilities a project will leave behind, not only how much it will extract, process or invest. Investment agreements, mining rights and public financing should carry capability-development plans with measurable milestones for engineering, supplier development, technology absorption, skills and research, monitored over the life of the project.
Development finance has a role too, by funding the supplier upgrading, technology acquisition and preparation that commercial investors often leave unfunded. In South Africa, the institutions that grant mineral rights and administer industrial incentives are best placed to act.
The green transition, Avenyo concludes, should be understood as a capabilities transition. Africa does not need to control every stage of every value chain. It needs to become steadily more capable of influencing the stages that count most for its development.
The full analysis, including three figures on mineral concentration, control points in the production system and the gap between compliance and capability, is available to download.
Publication Documents & Downloads
ETA_Policy_Analysis_Avenyo_Green_Transition_Illusion.pdf
Suggested Citation
venyo, E. K. (2026). The Green Transition Illusion: Why Critical Minerals Alone Will Not Industrialise Africa. ETA Fellows Programme Signature Analysis. Energy Transition Africa.
