Beyond Project Preparation: Closing Abuja's Clean-Energy Transaction Ownership Gap
New policy analysis by Toyeeb Arowona, Beyond Project Preparation: Abuja's public-facility solar is ready for finance, but no public body owns the deal.
Executive Summary
Public institutions in Abuja are increasingly exploring privately financed solar and energy-efficiency solutions, yet turning these projects from technical plans into long-term service contracts that can be financed remains difficult. Drawing on the author's work since 2022 on an anonymised portfolio of public facilities that has moved through identification, assessment, smart metering and economic analysis to the access-to-finance stage, this analysis finds that the principal constraint is no longer viable projects or preparation support. It is the lack of a clearly assigned, durable public body able to carry an aggregated transaction through procurement, payment security, contract execution and 25 years of management. Drawing on India's Energy Efficiency Services Limited as a comparator, it recommends reform before proliferation: assigning these functions within the existing structure of AMAC or the FCTA first, building on Nigeria's 2026 Model PPP Agreement, and creating a dedicated unit only if no existing body can perform the role.
Key Findings
The Abuja portfolio has progressed from facility identification and assessment through smart metering and economic analysis to the access-to-finance stage.
At this stage, the principal constraint is the lack of a clearly assigned public owner for the transaction, not a shortage of viable projects or expert support.
Incomplete bills, estimated meter readings and missing load profiles made smart metering a core task, because it turns buildings into a demand profile financiers can assess.
A 25-year Energy-as-a-Service contract needs a public counterparty that can hold the procurement mandate, confirm affordability and establish payment security.
Facilities linked to AMAC and the FCTA must each be mapped to the body that controls, budgets for and can contract for them before aggregation.
India's Energy Efficiency Services Limited shows how a public intermediary that owns or coordinates transactions turns many small loads into one financeable proposition.
The analysis is a single case, still before tender, and does not show a Nigeria-wide shortage of transaction capacity.
Since 2022, a portfolio of public facilities in Abuja has moved steadily through preparation: facility identification, assessments, smart-meter installation and economic analysis. The plan is a privately financed Energy-as-a-Service contract over about 25 years, with the assets passing to government at the end of the term. The project now sits at the access-to-finance stage, in discussion with Nigerian lenders and private energy service companies.
What it lacks is not a viable project or expert help. Toyeeb Arowona, who has worked on the portfolio since 2022, argues that the binding constraint is a clearly assigned public body able to carry the transaction from preparation through procurement, payment security, contract execution and 25 years of management.
Preparation is progressing; ownership is not
The technical work exposed a familiar problem. Historical electricity bills were incomplete, meter readings estimated, diesel records inconsistent and load profiles missing. Smart metering turned a set of buildings into a demand profile a financier can assess. It is a core task, not a side activity.
The harder question arrives when external experts hand the project to government. A long-term service contract needs a public counterparty that can hold the procurement mandate, confirm affordability, establish payment security, allocate risk, obtain approvals and manage the contract for decades. Lenders look for enforceable contracts, predictable cash flows and clear repayment mechanisms. A government payment-support mechanism has been discussed for the Abuja portfolio but not concluded.
Two authorities, one portfolio
The portfolio spans facilities associated with both the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) and the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA). They are not interchangeable contracting authorities. Before aggregation, each facility has to be mapped to the body that controls it, budgets for its energy, holds procurement authority and can take on a 25-year payment obligation.
Development partners can support assessments, modelling, structuring and procurement preparation. They cannot bind either authority to a long-term payment obligation. Nor can the federal PPP regulator stand in as owner: its role is regulatory and process-oriented.
Officials are used to buying solar equipment as a one-off capital purchase. Buying energy as a long-term service needs a different mix of commercial, fiscal and contract-management capability, the kind of institutional capability Africa's transition depends on.
What India shows
India's Energy Efficiency Services Limited (EESL) shows what transaction ownership adds. As a public intermediary, it standardised specifications, ran baseline surveys, aggregated demand, procured in bulk and used its financing position to serve cash-constrained city bodies. In Bhubaneswar's street-lighting project, payment security was designed in from the start, including escrow arrangements and automatic approval of 75 percent of operator invoices.
The lesson for Abuja is not to copy EESL. It is that aggregation becomes commercially useful when an organisation also owns or coordinates the transaction and can turn many small public loads into one financeable proposition.
Reform before proliferation
The first response should not be a new agency. The first test is whether an existing body within AMAC or FCTA has the legal authority and capacity, and if so, to give it clear responsibilities, staff and authority from preparation to contract end. Its mandate would cover five linked functions: the project pipeline and its energy data; advisers and approvals; procurement using standardised documents; a credible payment-security mechanism; and contract administration, performance verification and dispute management.
That fits current reform. Nigeria's 2026 Model PPP Agreement aims to replace project-by-project negotiation with a standard framework, and an Abuja programme should build from it rather than create a parallel system. Standardised, well-owned transactions are also what make projects eligible for domestic institutional capital. Only if no existing institution can perform these functions should a dedicated transaction unit be considered.
What the case does not prove
The analysis is careful about its limits. Abuja is one case and remains pre-tender. It cannot show that procurement would fail under current arrangements, that a transaction owner alone guarantees financial close, or that Nigeria as a whole lacks transaction ownership rather than viable projects or finance. Financing remains a real constraint.
The claim is narrower: at the point the Abuja portfolio has reached, access to finance depends on decisions that only a clearly assigned public owner can take. The paper proposes testing that through a pilot portfolio, with evidence on approval times, bidder participation, financing terms and contract performance.
The full analysis, including the transaction lifecycle figure, the India comparator and complete references, is available to download.
Suggested Citation
Arowona, T. (2026). Beyond Project Preparation: Closing the Transaction Ownership Gap in Abuja's Public-Facility Clean-Energy Projects. ETA Fellows Programme Signature Analysis. Abuja: Energy Transition Africa.